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NOTES
Administrative Law—Labor Law—Reviewability of the Secre-
tary of Labor's Determination Not to File Suit Under Section 402 of
the LMRDA—Dunlop v. Bachowski' —In a United Steelworkers of
America (USWA) election held on February 13, 1973, Walter
Bachowski was an unsuccessful candidate for district officer of District
20.2 Claiming that violations of section 401 of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) 3 had occurred,
Bachowski requested the USWA to set aside the District 20 election.
The Union refused to comply with Bachowski's request. 4 On June 21,
1973, after exhausting his intra-union remedies, Bachowski filed a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to section 402(a) of
the LMRDA, 5 thus invoking section 402(b)" which requires the Secre-
tary to investigate the complaint and. to decide whether to file suit
against the union to set aside the election.' After conducting an ap-
propriate investigation, the Secretary determined not to file suit
against the USWA to set aside the District 20 election."
Upon receiving notice of the Secretary's decision, Bachowski
filed suit in district court naming the Secretary and the USWA as
defendants." Bachowski sought a judgment declaring that the
1
 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
'Id. at 562. The election results were: Kluz (incumbent)-10,558, Bach-
owski-9,651, and Brummett-3,566. Id. In 1973, District 20 was the fourth largest dis-
trict in the USWA with 67,419 members and 190 locals. Id. at 579.
3 29 U.S.C. § 481 (1970). Section 401 establishes requirements for union elec-
tions. Bachowski alleged four violations: (I) that some union members were denied the
right to vote by secret ballot as required by § 401(a); (2) that observes were not allowed
at the polling places and at the counting of ballots in violation of § 401(c); (3) that the
union violated its own constitution and failed to allow voting in one local as required by
§ 401(e); and (4) that the union used dues to promote the candidacy 01 Kluz in viola-
tion of § 401(g). Brief for Respondent at 3, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
421 U.S. at 562.
29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970) provides in part: "A member of a labor
organization—(1) who has exhausted the remedies available under the constitution and
bylaws of such organization • may file a complaint with the Secretary within one
calendar month thereafter alleging the violation of any provision of section 481 of this
title ...."
29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970) provides in part:
The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds
probable cause to believe that a violation of' this subchapter has occurred
and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the filing of
such complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organization as an en-
tity in the district court of the United States in which such labor organiza-
tion maintains its principal office to set aside the invalid election, if any,
and to direct the conduct of an election ....
7
 421 U.S. at 562-63.
Five other complaints were filed with the Secretary concerning district races in
the USWA's February 13, 1973 election. The Secretary brought suit against the USWA
based on two of the complaints. Id. at 563.
9 ft is not clear why the USWA was included as a defendant. Bachowski may
have hoped that the court would set aside the District 20 election directly rather than
remanding to the Secretary.
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Secretary's action was arbitrary and capricious and an order compel-
ling the Secretary to file suit against the USWA.'° The district court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that under section 701(a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)" the Secretary's decision
whether to bring suit is not subject to judicial review." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in reversing the district
court, held that section 701(a) does not preclude judicial review of the
Secretary's determination and ordered the Secretary to provide the
plaintiff with a statement of the factors upon which the decision not
to file suit was based.' 3
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court in an 8-1
decision HELD: (1) the Secretary's refusal to file suit under section
402 of the LMRDA is reviewable under sections 702 and 704 of' the
APA;" (2) the availability of this judicial review requires the Secretary
to provide a complaining union member and the court with a state-
ment of reasons supporting his determination;" and (3) the scope of
this judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the
Secretary's statement of "reasons reveals that his decision is so irra-
tional as to be arbitrary and capricious." The Court's first holding,
concerning the reviewability of the Secretary's decision, was based on
a determination that the LMRDA contains no express or implied con-
gressional intent to bar such review." The final holding of the Court,
establishing a limited scope of review, was based on the understanding
that "the statute relies upon the special knowledge and discretion of
the Secretary for the determination of both the probable violation and
the probable effect, [and thus] the reviewing court is not authorized
to substitute its judgment for the decision of the Secretary not to
bring suit ... . "18
 In order to effectuate this congressional intent while
at the same time permitting intelligent judicial review of alleged
'° 421 U.S. at 563-64. In addition to Bachowski, one other USWA member whose
complaint was rejected filed suit against the Secretary. See Valenta v. Brennan. Civil
No. 74-11 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
" 5 U.S.C. 701(a) (1970) which provides: "This chapter applies, according to
the provisions thereof, except to the extent that —(I) statutes preclude judicial review;
or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
'= Bachowski v. Brennan, Civil No. 73-0954 (W.D. Pa. 1973). Technically, the dis-
trict court dismissed the action for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bachowski v.
Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1974). The court of appeals, finding subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) (district court has jurisdiction over cases aris-
ing under act of Congress regulating commerce), treated the issue as whether
Bachowski had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 82-83. The
Supreme Court stated that in view of its determination that § 701(a) did not bar review,
the technical grounds for the district court's dismissal were immaterial. 421 U.S. at 564
n.4. The distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and reviewability is discussed at
note 25 infra.
502 F.2d at 86, 90.
" 421 U.S. at 566.
15 ./d. at 571.
"Id. at 572-73.
"Id. at 566-68.
"Id. at 571.
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abuses of discretion, the Court, in its second holding, required the
Secretary to provide a statement of reasons supporting his decision.'"
Bachowski is significant on two levels. On a narrow level, the case
resolves a labor law issue that has confused lower federal courts for
several years; namely, whether the refusal of the Secretary to file suit
under section 402(b) of the LMRDA is subject to'judicial review. 24 On
a broader level, Bachowski presents the most recent Supreme Court
treatment of two of administrative law's most troublesome concepts: re-
viewability and the scope of review once an issue is determined to be
reviewable. 21
This note will explore the Bachowski decision in two parts; the
first dealing with the reviewability aspects of the decision and the sec-
ond dealing with the scope of review afforded by the Court. The
availability of review under the APA is determined by section 701(a).
Therefore, the reviewability issue will be analyzed by examining the
lower federal courts' interpretation of section 701(a) and by exploring
Bachowski's effect on that interpretation. This analysis will reveal that
Bachowski, through its failure to recognize common law reviewability,
"/d. at 571, 572-73. The statement of reasons is also designed to promote care-
ful consideration of union members' complaints by forcing the Secretary to "cover the
relevant points and eschew irrelevancies." Id. at 572.
The Court stated that the issue of whether a district court has the power to order
the Secretary to file suit was not before the Court because there had not yet been an
adjudication of whether the Secretary's action was arbitrary and capricious. /d. at 575 &
n.12. Three arguments for finding that a court would be without power to issue such
an order were noted, however. First, the order would violate the LMRDA's exclusive
enforcement provisions. The Court's response to this argument was to assume that the
Secretary would "proceed appropriately" when informed that he had abused his discre-
tion. Id. at 575-76. Second, the USWA argued that such an order would violate Article
11 of the Constitution because the judiciary would be invading the executive's pros-
ecutorial function. Brief' for the USWA at 9-12, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 921 U.S. 560
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Brief hrr the USWAL While the Court declined to address
this contention, 421 U.S. 575 n.I2, its response to the first objection seems applicable,
There would he no separation of powers problem if the Secretary proceeded without
the coercion of a court order. Third, the USWA argued that if the Secretary did insti-
tute suit at the request of the Court, Article III of the Constitution would be violated
because of a lack of' adversity between the Secretary and the union. Brief for the
USWA at 12-13. The Court also refused to address this contention. 421 U.S. at 575
n.12. It is suggested, however, that the adversity problem could be solved by allowing
the complaining union member to intervene in the Secretary's suit against the union.
Such intervention is permitted by Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 537
(1972).
"Compare, e.g., DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 383-84 (D.D.C. 1969)
(Secretary's decision is reviewable) and Schonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705, 708-09
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (same) with Katrinic v. Wirtz, 62' L.R.R.M. 2557 (D.D.C. 1966) (semble)
(Secretary's decision is not reviewable) and Altman v. Wirtz, 56 L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C.
1964) (same).
21
 That these concepts are in fact troublesome can be seen by the long debate be-
tween Kenneth Davis arid Raoul Berger over whether an action committed to agency
discretion may be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, Their conflict can be traced
through ten articles and books. Their numerous works on the subject are collected in
Mahinka, The Problem of Nonreviereability; judkial Control of Action Committed to Agency Dis-
cretion, 20 Viu., L. REv. I, 3 rm.10 & 13 (1974),
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continues a trend toward the judicial elimination of section 701(a)(2)
from the APA. The scope of review under the APA is determined by
section 706. 22 An analysis of the federal courts' interpretation of sec-
tion 706 and Bachowski's effect on that interpretation will ultimately re-
veal a recognition and modification of the concept of a limited scope
of review.
1. THE REVIEWABILITY DETERMINATION
"Reviewability" determines whether an administrative action is
subject to any judicial review." This concept is to be distinguished
from other doctrines that may prevent or dissuade a court from en-
tertaining a suit, such as standing, exhaustion of remedies, ripeness,
and finality." Reviewability is also to be distinguished from subject
matter jurisdiction, which refers to whether a particular court has
been authorized to take cognizance of the general class of cases to
which a particular case belongs." There is a basic presumption that
22 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970) provides in part:
The reviewing court shall— ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency ac-
tion, findings, and conclusions found to be —
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court,
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party, and clue account shall he taken of the rule of
prejudicial error.
23 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 28.01 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
DAVIS, T.F.x-r].
" Standing deals with whether a particular plaintiff can obtain review of a re-
viewable action. See generally DAVIS. TEXT, supra note 23, § 22.04 at 427; L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-545 (abr. student ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as JAFFE]. Exhaustion of remedies, ripeness, and finality deal with
whether a particular time is appropriate for review of a reviewable action. See generally
DAVIS, TEXT, SUpra note 23, §§ 20.01, 21.01; JAEFE,supra, at 395-98, 424-26.
:a federal courts, reviewability and subject matter jurisdiction are frequently
confused because of uncertainty as to whether the APA is an independent jurisdictional
grant. See generally Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962
and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308,
326-31 (1967). In those circuits that recognize the APA as a separate jurisdictional
grant, a determination of nonreviewability has the effect of a finding of a lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction where the complaint's only jurisdictional base is the APA. See
Rothman v. Hospital Serv., 510 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1975). Reviewability and subject
matter jurisdiction are often confused where the court has jurisdiction under a grant of
general jurisdiction. The district court in Bachowski, for example, dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it found the action barred by section 701(a)
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agency action is subject to judicial review. 26 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has stated that "judicial review of agency action ... will not be
cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the
purpose of Congress."27
Under the general scheme of the APA, final agency action is judi-
cially reviewable unless excepted by the Act. Section 702 of the APA
provides that a person "suffering legal wrong because of agency action
... is entitled to judicial review thereof."" Section 704 provides that
"fa)gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judi-
cial review." 2 ° Section 701(a), however, creates important exceptions to
the broad language of sections 702 and 704; "This chapter applies ...
except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2)
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.""
The difference between these two subdivisions depends initially
on specific language clifferences.at The word "statute" in section
70l(a)(1) indicates that an administrative action can be placed under
that section only if there is a congressional intent to preclude review.
Such an intent may be expressed in a statute's language or implied
from a statute's purpose and legislative history. 32 Where such an in-
tent to preclude review is present, the agency action will be
categorized as falling within section 701(a)(l). The presumption of re-
view, however, which the Supreme Court identified in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 33 tends to restrict findings of express or im-
plied preclusion. This judicial aversion to nonreviewability causes
courts to construe statutes so as to avoid language that seems to be
an express preclusion. 34 While courts are even more reluctant to find
an implied preclusion, occasionally they do. 35 An example of implied
of the APA. As the court of appeals pointed out, the district court had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) because the cause of action arose out of an act regulat-
ing interstate commerce—the LMRDA. Bachawski, 502 F.2d at 82.
" Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). See generally jAFTE,
supra note 24, at 339-53.
27 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
" 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
2 ' 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
3" 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). For the complete text of § 701(a) see note 11 supra.
31 For the text of § 701(a) see note . 11 supra.
32 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970); Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas,
509 F.2d 247, 258-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 123 (1975); W. CEI.I.HURN C.
BYSE, ADmiNisTitivrivE LAW 217-20 (5th ed. 1974).
" 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
" See, e.g., Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 U.S. 460, 467-68
(1970), where the Court held that suit to enjoin induction was not barred by a statute
stating "no judicial review shall be made of the classification ... of any registrant ,
except as a defense to a criminal prosecution;" Oestereich v. Selective Serv, Sys. Local
Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1968); (I, Eskra v. Morton, 380 F. Supp. 205, 212-13
(W.D. Wis. 1974).
" Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 674 (1960) (alternative holding) (Schilling is
discussed in the text at notes 90-94 infra.); ef Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation
Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 305-06 (1943) (Pre-APA).
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preclusion is the nonreviewability of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) General Counsel's decision not to initiate an unfair
labor practice complaint. In Vaca v. Sipes, 36 the Court adopted a lower
court's conclusion that Congress intended such unfair labor practice
complaints to protect a public, as opposed to a private, interest and
consequently that Congress intended to bar judicial review designed
to force their issuance."
Categorization under section 701(a)(2) similarly depends on con-
gressional intent; however, the relevant congressional intent for the
purposes of this section is one to grant the agency broad discretion,
not one to preclude judicial review." The word "law" in section
70I(a)(2) suggests that an action may be committed to agency discre-
tion explicitly or by implication, and further, that an implied congres-
sional intent to commit an action to agency discretion may be based
either on statutory interpretation or on common law considerations
since the word "law" is broader than the word "statute" used in sec-
tion 701(a)(I). 3° These common law considerations include, among
others, the courts' deference to agency expertise 4° and the peculiar
nature of the administrative action involved.' The word "law" also
suggests that constitutional principles—such as the separation of pow-
36 386 U.S. 171, 182 & n.8 (1967). The Court's conclusion was based on the case
of United Elec. Contractors ASS . 11 v. Ordman, 258 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), af/'d
per curium, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967). In Electrical
Contractors, the district court stated that "(slection 3(d) of the NLRA precludes judicial
review of the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint ...." 258 F. Supp. at 763.
Standing alone, § 3 (d), which stated that the General Counsel "shall have final author-
ity, in behalf of the Board, in respect of the ... issuance of complaints ....", Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970), is no different
than other finality clauses held insufficient to support a finding of express preclusion.
See cases cited at note 34 supra. However, the court felt that § 3(d), in conjunction with
the NLRA's specific statutory review provisions, Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 §§ 10(e)-(j), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(e)-(j) (1970), and the discretionary nature of the
General Counsel's decision, 258 F. Supp. at 761, did support a finding of implied
statutory preclusion. See generally Note, 63 Nw, U. L. REV. 106 (1968).
" Accord, Seafarers' Union v. NLRB, 88 L.R.R.M. 2629 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Hotel
and Restaurant Employees Local 411 v. Gottfried, 36 AD. L.2n 466, 467 (W.D. Mich.
1974). But cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1958); Lentschke v. Nash, 84
L.R.R.M. 2833, 2834 (S.D. Tex. 1973). The similarity between the General Counsel's
function under the NLRA and the Secretary of Labor's function under § 402 of the
LMRDA has been commented upon in Hopson, Judicial Review of the Secretary of Labor's
Decision Not to Sue to se Aside A Union Election Under Title IV of the LMRDA, 18 WAYNE L.
Rev, 1281, 1297-98 (1972); and Case Comment, 50 B. U. L. REV. 310, 315.17 (1970). As
discussed in the text at notes 131-33 infra, the Secretary unsuccessfully argued in
Bachowski that this analogy supported a similar finding of implied statutory preclusion.
78 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 at 81 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS, TREATISE].
"Id.
"See Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249-51 (1st Cir. 1970); Daugherty v. Un-
ited States, 86 L.R.R.M. 3075, 3078 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
41 Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317-19 (1958) (Panama
Canal is discussed in the text at notes 95.98 infra.); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) (national defense); see generally JAFFE, supra note 24, at 363-71.
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ers and political question doctrines42 —may Lead to the conclusion that
an administrative action falls under section 701(a)(2).
The categorization of an administrative action under either sec-
tion 701(a)(1) or 701(a)(2) is significant. Sections 702 and 704 of the
APA authorize judicial review of final administrative actions." Section
701(a), through the phrase "Whis chapter applies ... except to the ex-
tent that,"44 limits the review authorized by sections 702 and 704.
However, section 701(a) says nothing about making an administrative
action ultimately nonreviewable. Once sections 702 and 704 no longer
apply, due to the section 701(a) exception, an action may still be re-
viewable if some other statute or constitutional principle does not bar
review and if common law reviewability was not eliminated by the
enactment of the APA.
By definition, administrative actions falling under section
701(a)(I) are made nonreviewable by statute. In the absence of con-
stitutional infirmities, a court is required to follow a discernible legis-
lative intent to preclude review. 45 Consequently, the same congres-
sional intent that placed an action under section 701(a)(1) requires a
finding of ultimate nonreviewability. Thus, even if common law re-
viewability exists, it can have no application in section 701(a)(I) cases.
Whether an administrative action that falls under section 701(a)(2) is
thereby made nonreviewable is less certain. There is by definition no
congressional intent to preclude review in a section 701(a)(2) case, or
else the case would have fallen under section 701(a)(1). If, however,
common law review survived the enactment of the APA, administra-
tive actions that fall under section 701(a)(2) might still be reviewable.
While the Supreme Court's holdings do not mandate that an ac-
tion committed to agency discretion be nonreviewable, 40 some of its
statements seem to support that conclusion. For example, in Panama
Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc.,'" the Court stated that the APA "excludes
from the categories of cases subject to judicial review 'agency action'
that is by law committed to agency discretion." 4 " In Abbott
Laboratories, the Court stated that the APA "embodies the basic pre-
sumption of judicial review ... so long as no statute precludes such
42
 Jensen v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 512 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1975) (treaty
right); cf. United States v. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940). Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV.
367, 380-95 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Saferstein], presents a list of nine elements that
may lead a court to conclude that an administrative action is committed to agency dis-
cretion.
" See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
44
 For the complete text of § 701(a) see note 11 supra.
4 ' Whether Congress may preclude review of a claim that an administrative ac-
tion violated constitutional guarantees is an open question. See Battaglia v. General
Motors Corp., 190 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A
Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 993 & n.155 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Synthesis].
4a See text accompanying notes 99-107 infra.
47 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
48 1d. at 317.
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relief or the action is not one committed by law to agency discretion
Lower federal courts have, in fact, expressly held that
categorization under section 701(a)(2) results in nonreviewability. 5 °
For example, in Ferry v. Udall," where the decision to sell government
land under the Isolated Tracts Act was held committed to the Secre-
tary of Interior's discretion, the Ninth Circuit, without examining the
possibility of common law reviewability, flatly stated: "[W]e are with-
out power to review the Secretary's decision in this case."" An exami-
nation of the common law reviewability issue will be made below, 53
but the current view appears to be that there is no common law
reviewability."
Assuming, therefore, that categorization under section 701(a)(2)
does result in nonreviewability, the problem arises of reconciling the
language of that section with statements in Abbott Laboratories that ju-
dicial review "will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to
believe that such was the purpose of Congress"" and that there is a
"basic presumption of judicial review ...." 58 The first statement
seems to require an interpretation of section 70 l(a)(2) that changes
the word "law" to "statute." Common law and constitutional consider-
ations are thus irrelevant to section 701(a)(2) if that section results in
nonreviewability and if nonreviewability can be based only on a "pur-
" 387 U.S. at 140. Accord, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (the APA "provides that [agency action] ... is subject to judicial
review except where there is a statutory prohibition on review or where 'agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law.' "); Association of Data Processing Serv. Or-
ganizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970) (the APA "provides that the provi-
sions of the Act authorizing judicial review apply 'except to the extent that—(1) statutes
preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law.' "); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970) (the APA "allows judicial review of
agency action except where '(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.' ").
EO E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Smithfield v. First Nat'l Bank of Eastern N.C., 232 F.
Supp. 725, 729 (E.D.N.C. 1964); Greyhound Corp. v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 440,
443 (N.D. III. 1963).
" 336 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1964),
" Id. at 711. Accord, Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1251 (1st Cir. 1970) ("We
therefore hold that the approval of rents and charges [by the FHA) is a 'matter commit-
ted to agency discretion by law', and thus not subject to judicial review."); Knight
Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 395 F.2d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 1968) (Since the APA
"prohibits judicial review of agency action 'committed to agency discretion by law,' we
are without power to review the Postmaster-General's decision denying a postage re-
fund."); Daugherty v. United States, 86 L.R.R.M. 3075, 3077-78 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (ac-
tion committed to agency discretion is "excepted from judicial review"). Set also Linea v.
Morton, 445 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1971) (if the action fell under 5 701(a)(2) the
court would not have considered the issue of sovereign immunity because no review
would have been available). But cf. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973) (action fell under 5 701(a)(2) but court still dealt
with sovereign immunity issue).
53 See text at notes 82-107 infra.
" See, e.g., cases cited at note 50 supra.
" 387 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added).
56 Id.
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pose of Congress." The courts' apparent reconciliation of this problem
has been to blur the distinctions between sections 701(a)(1) and
701(a)(2). 67 Determinations concerning common law and constitu-
tional considerations are usually combined with determinations con-
cerning congressional intent," and an intent to grant broad discretion
is equated with one to preclude review."
Reconciliation of the language of section 701(a)(2) with the pre-
sumption of review, noted in the second of the Abbott Laboratories
statements, involves similar problems.. Virtually all administrative ac-
tion involves the exercise of some discretion. 6 ° Therefore, if courts
are to review agency 'action and to ,effectuate the presumption in
favor of review, a method of limiting the number of cases falling
under section 701(a)(2) must be developed." In Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 62
 the Court emphasized this desire to limit
section 701(a)(2) by stating that the provision for action committed to
agency discretion "is a very narrow exception." 63
In general, the federal courts have employed two methods for
narrowing the reach of section 701(a)(2): the "committed" approach,
which seems to have been rejected, 64 and the "extent" approach. The
committed approach focuses on the word "committed" in section
701(a)(2): "(Obis chapter applies ... except to the extent that ... (2)
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 66 Under this
approach, discretionary administrative actions are reviewable until
they reach the level of being "committed" to agency discretion." An
action is considered to be committed to agency discretion where the
enabling statute is drawn in permissive rather than mandatory
" I I n Bachareski, for example, the Court dealt with § 701(a) without ever mention-
ing its subdivisions. 421 U.S. at 566. But see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) where the Court does distinguish between §§ 701(a)(1)
and 701(a)(2) for the purpose of determining whether APA review was barred. See text
at note 78 infra.
"See cases cited at notes 40 & 41 supra. Saferstein, supra note 42, at 377 n.43,
even suggests that there is no meaningful distinction between §§ 701(a)(I) and
701(a)(2).
" Berger, in rejecting the view that there is no distinction between H 701(a)(1)
and 701(a)(2), states that "(l]t is a common-place that one avoids constructions that re-
sult in surplusage or tautology." Berger, Synthesii, supra note 45, 977-78 n.66.
6° Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 711 (9th Cir. 1964).
8 ' in Ferry, the court stated that "[t]he analytical problem is that of determining
when the agency action is 'committed to agency discretion' within the meaning of sec-
tion [701(a)(2) of the APA], and when it merely 'involves' discretion which is neverthe-
less reviewable." 336 F.2d at 711.
82
 401 U.S. 402 (1971),
" Id. at 410. The significance of this statement on the existence of common law
reviewability is discussed in the text accompanying notes 106-107 infra.
84
 See text and notes at notes 71-73 infra.
88
 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
" Professor Davis stated that "(elmphasis should be put on the word 'committed.'
Action 'committed' to agency discretion by law is that action which is so far committed
as not to be reviewable, and agency action which is not so far committed is reviewable."
DAVIS, TENT, supra note 23, § 28.05 at 515.
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terms. 67 In Sierra Club v. Hardin, 68
 the court indicated that a permis-
sive statute is one where the agency may refuse to act even if all
statutory requirements are met, while a mandatory statute is one
where the agency must act if all the statutory requirements are met."
The committed approach is exemplified by the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach in Ferry where the court stated that "courts may not review a
decision committed to the Secretary's discretion pursuant to a 'permis-
sive type' statute, while they may do so where the decision was made
pursuant to a 'mandatory type' statute ...." 7 ° That the distinction be-
tween permissive and mandatory statutes is unworkable in practice,
however, soon became apparent.n In fact, in Ness Investment Corp. v.
Department of Agriculture, 72 a case involving the reviewability of the
Secretary of Agriculture's denial of a special use permit, the Ninth
Circuit appears to have abandoned the approach altogether."
The "extent" approach is a second method by which courts have
narrowed the reach of section 701(a)(2). By focusing on the words
"except to the extent that" in section 701(a)'s introductory clause,"
courts have been able to treat section 701(a)(2) as withholding review
by degrees." Thus, an action falling under section 701(a)(2) is non-
reviewable only to the extent it is committed to agency discretion by
law." Under the extent approach, the agency action is conceptualized
as consisting of a number of separable elements, some of which are
reviewable and others of which are nonreviewable. 77 In Overton Park,
67 The permissive vs. mandatory dichotomy was suggested in Schilling v. Rogers,
363 U.S. 666, 674 (1960) ("[Tlhe permissive terms in which [the statute is] drawn per-
suasively indicate that [its] administration was committed entirely to the discretionary
judgment of the Executive Branch .. . .").
66 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 197 1 ).
69 Id. at 1 12.
7° 336 F.2d at 712. Accord, Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 351 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Walker, 409 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1969); Knight Newspapers, Inc. v.
United States, 395 F.2d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 1968).
" See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1133,
1141-42 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1151 (1970) (en banc), petition for cert.
dismissed, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). In Suwannee Steamship Co. v. United States, 354 F.
Supp. 1361, 1368-69 (Cust. Ct. 1973), the court stated, "[defiance on the 'permissive
versus mandatory' test for nonreviewability ... is fast being laid to rest by ... federal
Coll rts ."
72
 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975).
" 512 F.2d at 714-15 & n.14. Accord, Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 471
(9th Cir. 1975).
74
 For the text of § 701(a)(2) see note 11 supra.
" Davis has stated that the APA is "carefully framed to avoid the all-or-none fal-
lacy ...." Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411, 428 (1954). See
generally Saferstein, supra note 42, at 372, 395-96.
78
 When dealing with § 701(a), courts frequently overlook the language, "to the
extent that." See statements cited in note 49 supra.
77
 When fashioning limited scopes of review, courts also rely on the words, "to
the extent that." When dealing with scope of review, however, courts conceptualize
judicial review as consisting of a number of separable issues rather than agency action as
consisting of a number of separable elements. See text at notes 156 infra.
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the Supreme Court suggested the appropriateness of this view by stat-
ing that the APA's legislative history reveals that section 701(a)(2) is
applicable "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such
broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.' " 78
An example of the extent approach is East Oakland-Fruitvale
Planning Council v. Rum.sfeld" where the Ninth Circuit, after holding
that the refusal of the Director of the Office of Economic Opportu-
nity to override a governor's veto of funds for an advocacy group was
non reviewable, stated:
It does not follow, however, that no aspect of the
Director's action can be reviewed. Agency action is made
unreviewable by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) only "to the extent"
that, it is committed to agency discretion....
Accordingly, separable issues appropriate for judicial
determination are to be reviewed, though other aspects of
the agency action may be committed to the agency's expert-
ise and discretion."
The court concluded that the Director's ultimate decision not to over-
ride the governor's veto was a separable, nonreviewable element but
that review could be provided to determine if the Director had
considered only relevant factors."
The need to reconcile the language of section 701(a)(2) with the
presumption of review through either the committed or extent ap-
proaches could be eliminated altogether by the recognition of com-
mon law reviewability. Prior to the enactment of the APA in 1946,
administrative action was subject to judicial review at common law. 82
The question thus becomes whether by enacting the APA, Congress
eliminated common law judicial review. If common law reviewability
still exists, the need to limit the application of section 701(a)(2),
through either the committed or extent approach, would be obviated
because the inapplicability of the APA would not necessarily result in
nonreviewability. Such an interpretation would preserve both the con-
gressional purpose behind the enactment of section 701(a)(2) 83 and
7" 401 U.S. at 410.
7 ° 471 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 533.
"I Id. at 534-35.
"See, e.g., Dismuke v. United States, 297 U.S. 167, 171-73 (1936); American
School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 108-11 (1902). See generally
Davis, TEXT, supra note 23, § 28.02 at 510; Davis, TREATISE, supra note 38, §§ 28.04,
28.05.
°' The presence of § 701(a)(2) in the APA indicates that there must have been
some purpose behind its enactment. Unfortunately, that purpose is. not revealed in the
APA's legislative history. The Senate Judiciary Committee report stated that "Whe basic
exception of matters committed to agency discretion would apply even if not stated at
the outset," but it is unclear as to why it should apply and what effect its application
has. S. REP, No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945). One explanation for the presence
of § 701 (a)(2) is suggested in the text at notes 88-89 infra.
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the judicial preference for providing at least some review of all agency
actions.
The proposition that common law reviewability still exists is sup-
ported by the language of section 559 of the APA, 84 the 1966 revision
of section 701(a) of the APA, and some of the case law interpreting
the APA. Section 559 provides that the APA's review provisions "do
not limit or repeal additional requirements imposed by statute
or otherwise recognized by law." 85
 Common law review of action
committed to agency discretion could be an "additional [requirement}
... otherwise recognized by law." In addition, the APA was originally
drawn in 1946 in terms suggesting that a person aggrieved was not
"entitled" to judicial review if an action was committed to agency
discretion." In the 1966 revision of the APA, this language was
modified" to read "this chapter applies." There would have been no
need to modify the seemingly absolute prohibition in the 1946 Act
with the less than absolute reference to "this chapter" in the 1966 Act
if' there could be no review outside the APA. While the legislative his-
tory is silent as to the reason for this change, it may be that Congress
wished to emphasize that common law reviewability was not super-
seded by the APA. Moreover, a reason why Congress might have
wanted to preserve common law reviewability is readily apparent. The
APA expanded the scope of judicial review of administrative action. 88
By retaining common law reviewability, the courts would be free, once
an action was categorized as falling under section 70I(a)(2), to develop
less intrusive means of inquiry where the need for discretion and re-
view could be balanced."
The Supreme Court's statements in Schilling v. Rogers 9° provide
support for the view that common law reviewability survived the
enactment of the APA. In Schilling, the plaintiff sought judicial review
of an agency determination that he was not entitled to compensation
for property confiscated by the United States in connection with
World War II." The plaintiff claimed that even if review was barred
" 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970).
°° "Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion—(a) Any person suffering legal wrong because of
any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning
of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof." Administrative Pro-
cedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 243.
87 Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 701(a), 80 Stat. 392.
88
 In Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956), the Court refers to
"the expanded mode of review granted by" the APA. Again in Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S.
367, 379 (1962), the APA is called "broadly remedial."
" Once free of the APA, a court's review might also be more searching. This
possibility is remote, however, because the statutory, common law, and constitutional
considerations that place an action under 701(a)(2) would seemingly mandate less in-
trusive review. See DAVIS, TEXT, supra note 23, § 217 at 515.
9° 363 U.S. 666 (1960).
°' Id. at 669-70.
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under the APA, he was entitled to some review because the agency's
denial was arbitrary and capricious." The Court, after finding that
the action was not reviewable under the APA, 93 indicated that in some
situations non-APA review might be available:
This is not a case in which it is charged either that an ad-
ministrative official has refused or failed to exercise a
statutory discretion, or that he has acted beyond the scope
of his powers, where the availability of judicial review
would be attended by quite different considerations than
those controlling here."
The only other case in which the Supreme Court appears to
have held that an administrative action was categorized under section
70 l(a)(2) is Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc."' While the Court did
refuse to review the merits of the agency's decision not to initiate rate
readjustment proceedings, 96
 it did not place the agency's action en-
tirely beyond review. For example, the Court appears to have deter-
mined that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious by stating,
"[t]hese are matters on which experts may disagree ...." 97 In addi-
tion, the Court warned that it would "intrude" if the agency refused
to take a prescribed action."
It is true that in some cases where the Supreme Court has held
an action reviewable under the APA, the Court has made statements
suggesting that if the action had fallen under section 701(a)(2), the re-
sult would have been nonreviewability." However, a careful examina-
" Id. at 676.
"' Id. at 670, 676.
94 Id. at 676-77. Accord, Gutnayer v. McGranery, 108 F. Supp. 290, 291-92
(D.D.C. 1952), modified sub nom. Brownell v. Gutnayer, 212 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(order under Displaced Persons Act not reviewable under the APA but nevertheless re-
viewable for arbitrary and capricious action); cf. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235
(1953) (deportation order not reviewable under APA but nevertheless reviewable on
habeas corpus petition); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 44-45, 47 (5th Cir. 1949),
aff d by equally divided court per curiam, 340 U.S. 880 (1950), on remand, 100 F. Supp. 74,
80-81 (N.D. Ga. 1951) (order revoking parole not reviewable under APA but neverthe-
less reviewable on habeas corpus .
 petition to determine whether it is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and therefore not arbitrary or an abuse of discretion). It is interesting
to note that in Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140, the Court, when considering the ef-
fect of the APA on common law reviewability, uses the word "reinforced" rather than
"replaced."
" 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
" "We think the initiation of a proceeding for readjustment of the tolls of the
Panama Canal is a matter that Congress has left to the discretion of the Panama Canal
Co." Id. at 317.
"Id. at 317. This interpretation of Panama Canal has been suggested by Berger,
Synthesis, supra note 45, at 971 n.32.
"Panama Canal, 356 U.S. at 318. In addition, the case was decided before the
revision of the APA, when the language was less ambiguous as to the availability of
common law review. See text at notes 87-91 supra.
99
 See the cases and statements at note 49 and accompanying text supra.
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lion of statements in Abbott Laboratories,'" Overton Park,'" Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 102 and Barlow v.
Collins 1 °3 supports an argument that the Court was merely stating that
if section 701(a)(2) had applied, the APA could not provide review.'"
Indeed, the Court was not faced with the issue of what effect section
701(a)(2) had on common law reviewability because the section was
found not to apply in those cases. 105 Even the Supreme Court's efforts
to emasculate section 701(a)(2) in Overton Park, limiting its applicability
to those rare instances where there is "no law to apply,"'" does not
necessarily indicate that the Court believes that there is no review
available outside of the APA. Rather the Court could have been em-
phasizing that only in unusual circumstances will a discretionary ad-
ministrative action be exempted from the more demanding APA
review ) 07
Thus, the Supreme Court has not, in either its holdings or dicta,
explicitly rejected the existence of common law review. If common
law review does exist, a court could be freed of the burden of recon-
ciling the language of section 701(a)(2) with the presumption of re-
view. Instead, a court could concentrate on fashioning a scope of re-
view that strikes a balance between agency discretion and judicial in-
trusion.
The major weakness of the common law approach is that a court
100 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
1 °) 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
102 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970).
103 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970).
101
 More of a problem is presented by Justice Brennan's statement in his Barlow
dissent that if an action falls under either §§ 701(a)(1) or 701(a)(2), "the plaintiff is out
of court ... because Congress has stripped the judiciary of authority to review agency
action." Barlow, 397 U.S. at 173-74. One explanation could be that Brennan's dissent
was designed to show how the majority had confused the concepts of reviewability and
standing. Reviewability was never at issue in Brennan's dissent. Therefore, Brennan
could have used the words "out of court" to emphasize that a lack of standing and non-
reviewability can "look alike" without considering their significance for the issue of re-
viewability. In addition, it is not clear if Brennan meant Congress stripped the courts of
authority to review in the APA or in the underlying substantive statute. If the former,
the statement does suggest that review is impossible outside the APA. If the latter, the
statement may mean that there are statutes where the intent to preclude review can be
implied from the presence of discretion.
'"Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 141-46; Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413; Data
Processing, 397 U.S. at 156-57; Barlow, 397 U.S. at 165-66.
106
 402 U.S. at 4W.
"r Accord, Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956). Of course, it is
possible that common law nonreviewability could exist along with common law reviewa-
bility. Thus, a plaintiff would be little better off once outside the APA if actions com-
mitted to agency discretion by law were nonreviewable at common law. Berger ques-
tions whether there ever was common law nonreviewability of arbitrary or capricious ac-
tions. Berger, Synthesis, supra note 45, at 965-66 nn. 5-8. If there was common law
nonreviewability, the Supreme Court has apparently eliminated it. See, e.g., Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 140 ("Wudicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved
person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the
purpose of Congress.").
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might be separated unnecessarily from the detailed body of law that
has developed under the APA. Once outside of the APA's review pro-
visions, a court may feel free to modify, in addition to scope of re-
view, doctrines such as standing, ripeness, exhaustion, and finality.
Consequently, the balance struck between discretion and intrusion
through modifications of scope of review could be destroyed by re-
strictive or expansive approaches to these other administrative law
doctrines.
Against this backdrop of general administrative law principles,
the Supreme Court decided Bachowski. In Bachowski, the Court reaf-
firmed the existing interpretation of section 701(a)(1). Bachowski is
likely to have, however, a disruptive effect on the existing interpreta-
tion of section 701(a)(2) because the Court, in reaching its conclusion,
failed to distinguish between the two subdivisions of section 701(a).
The Court ambiguously concluded that "the Secretary's decision not
to sue is not excepted from judicial review by 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)
...." 108 Subsequent discussion leaves little doubt that the action did
not fall under section 701(a)(1). 109 As to section 701(a)(2), however,
the Court's language indicates that it was inapplicablem while its
treatment of the scope of review suggests that it was applicable."'
As noted above, an administrative action can be categorized
under section 701(a)(1) based on an express or implied statutory
preclusion.'" In Bachowski, the Secretary made both arguments and
both were rejected." 3 The Secretary's express preclusion claim was
that under section 403 of the LMRDA," 4 suit by the Secretary is the
exclusive method for challenging a completed union election. 15 That
Bachowski's suit was in reality such a challenge to the USWA's elec-
tion, thus violating the Secretary's exclusive powers, could be seen
'°° 421 U.S. at 566.
'"' The Secretary urges that the structure of the statutory scheme, its ob-
jectives, its legislative history, the nature of the administrative action in-
volved, and the conditions spelled out with respect thereto, combine to
evince a congressional meaning to prohibit judicial review of his decision.
We have examined the materials the Secretary relies upon. They do not
reveal to us any congressional purpose to prohibit judicial review.
Id. at 567.
"° The Court's statement that sections "702 and 704 subject the Secretary's deci-
sion to judicial review under the standard specified in § 706(2)(A)," id. at 566, indicates
that the action was not removed from the APA through the operation of section
701(a)(2).
"' The Court created a scope of review that differs from that which would apply
if the case were governed by section 706. See text at notes 179-94 infra.
"'See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
13 421 U.S. at 566-67, 567-68, 567 n.7.
" 4 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970). The relevant portion of 403 is "iebdsting rights and
remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with respect to
elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the provisions of this sub-
chapter. The remedy provided by this subchapter for challenging an election already
conducted shall be exclusive."
"s Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner).
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from the inclusion of the Union as a defendant)" In DeVito v.
Shultz,'" the district court rejected a similar express preclusion
argument. 18
 The Supreme Court in Bachowski similarly rejected the
argument, stating that the "LMRDA contains no provision that ex-
plicitly prohibits judicial review .... Section [403] is . . . not a prohibi-
tion against judicial review but simply underscores the exclusivity of
the [section 402] procedures in post-election cases."'" The Court
seems to have concluded that section 403 is not concerned with judi-
cial review at all. The section merely emphasizes that rights secured
by the LMRDA may be enforced through private actions before an
election but only through the Secretary's action after an election.'"
Thus, the Court, while agreeing that the Secretary's post-election
remedy is exclusive, did not equate exclusivity with a preclusion of re-
view. In light of the narrow interpretation given to express preclusion
clauses generally) 2 ' the Court's determination that section 403 does
not expressly preclude review appears correct.
The Secretary made two implied preclusion arguments. First, the
Secretary claimed that the language and legislative history of the
LMRDA reveal an intent to preclude review. 122
 Second, the Secretary
argued that his role was analogous to that of the NLRB's General
Counsel when issuing an unfair labor practice -complaint and that,
consequently, he should similarly be entitled to nonreviewable
discretion. ' 23
The legislative history of the LMRDA' 24 includes numerous
statements which appear to support the first implied preclusion ar-
gument. For example, one Senate report contains the statement that
the remedy provided in section 402 of the LMRDA would be "the sole
remedy and private litigation would be precluded." 125
 In another in-
stance, the same Senate report emphasizes that one of the LMRDA's
aims is to clear any cloud over union offices quickly. 126 Statements such
as these, in conjunction with the exclusivity clause of section 403 127
and the sixty day time limit of section 402(13)) 28 could reasonably in-
"'See note 9 supra.
"? 300 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.D.C.), rehearing, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682 (1969).
"I' "While this remedy is exclusive it does not follow that the Federal Courts are
necessarily without power or jurisdiction ...." 300 F. Supp. at 382.
ut 421 U.S. at 566-67.
"" See generally Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964); Comment, 42 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 166 (1974).
'" See note 34 supra.
122
 Brief for Petitioner at 12-16, 23.
123 1d. at 25-27.
"4
 The LMRDA's legislative history has been the subject of extensive analysis.
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HAIM L. Rev. 851
(1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959. 58 MICH.
L. REV, 819 (1960); Note, 78 HAM L. REV. 1617 (1965).
$25 S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959).
'"/d. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. 463, 468 n.7 (1968).
'" For the text of § 403 see note 114 supra.
"' For the text of § 402(b) see note 6 supra.
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dicate a congressional intent to preclude all judicial review in order to
prevent private litigation and delay. Indeed, a number of lower fed-
eral courts have reached that conclusion.' 29 In Bachowski, however, the
Court simply stated, without further explanation: "We have examined
the materials the Secretary relies upon. They do not reveal to us any
congressional purpose to prohibit judicial review .... We therefore
reject the Secretary's [first implied] argument as without merit."'"
The Supreme Court's only reference to the Secretary's second
implied preclusion argument—analogizing his role to that of the
NLRB's General Counsel—is in a footnote which states: "We agree
with the Court of Appeals ... that there is no merit in the Secretary's
contention that his decision is an unreviewable exercise of pros-
ecutorial discretion."'" The court of appeals rejected the Secretary's
argument on the grounds that the General Counsel, when issuing an
unfair labor practice complaint, is concerned with vindicating a public
interest while the Secretary, when suing to set aside a defective elec-
tion, is additionally concerned with remedying a private wrong.'" In
closing, the court of appeals indicated that holding the Secretary's de-
cision nonreviewable would leave the complaining union member
without a remedy.'"
The most troubling aspect of Bachowski is the Court's failure to
make an explicit finding with regard to section 701(a)(2). In spite of
the Court's language implying that the Secretary's action was not ex-
cepted from the review provisions of the APA,'" the Court's treat-
ment of the scope of review issue requires the conclusion that to
129 Ravaschieri v. Schultz, 75 L.R.R.M. 2272, 2275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970):McArthy v.
Wirtz, 65 L.R.R.M. 2411, 2412-13 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Katrinic v. Wirtz, 62 L.R.R.M. 2557
(D.D.C. 1966) (semble); Altman v. Wirtz, 56 L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C. 1964) (semble).
139 421 U.S. at 567-68.
131 Id. at 567 rt.7.
"2 Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 87 & n.11 (3rd Cir. 1974).
133 Id. at 87-88. The court of appeals' distinctions do not withstand analysis. The
major aim of the LMRDA is to benefit the public by ensuring free and democractic
union elections, not to provide complaining union members with publicly financed legal
counsel. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. 463, 469-71 (1968). In addi-
tion, private parties stand to gain back pay or other benefits from a successful unfair
labor practice suit. Brief for Petitioner at 30. Finally, the failure of the SeCretary of
Labor to institute a suit under section 402(b) of the LMRDA does not leave the com-
plaining union member totally without a remedy. Ross v. International Bhd. of Flee.
Workers, 513 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1975) (suit seeking recovery of monetary damages for
election-related torts not precluded by § 402 of LMRDA). The Court should have re-
jected the analogy argument not because the roles of the Secretary and the General
Counsel are distinguishable, but rather because the NLRB cases are probably incor-,
rectly decided. The nonreviewability of the General Counsel's decision was determined
before the Supreme Court had emphasized the presumption of reviewability in cases
such as Overton Park and Abbott Laboratories. The evidence of a congressional intent to
preclude review found in cases such as United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 258
F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), and approved in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 & n.8
(1967), see note 36 .supra, is weak when compared to the evidence rejected in Bachowski.
The demise of the nonreviewability of the General Counsel's decision has been pre-
dicted. Case Comment, 50 B.U. L. REv, 310, 320 (1970).
" 4 See note 110 supra.
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some extent the provisions of the APA were, in fact, inapplicable to
the Secretary's decision to sue under section 402 of the LMRDA.
The Court modified the scope of review usually available under the
APA'" by requiring review to be based on a statement of reasons
rather than the whole administrative record'" and by prohibiting all
review of the factual basis of the Secretary's conclusions."' This
modification is contrary to the language and legislative history of the
APA. The Senate report accompanying the enactment of the APA
states that once section 701(a)(2) is found inapplicable, "When the de-
termination of the facts does not lie in agency discretion but must be
supported by either the administrative or judicial record."'" In addi-
tion, these modifications seem to violate section 559 of the APA,
which states that a "fsJubsequent statute may not be held to supersede
or modify [the APA's review provisions] ... except to the extent that
it does so expressly."'" The Court in Bachowski relied on a "congres-
sional purpose narrowly to limit the scope of judicial review of the
Secretary's decision ....""° This conclusion, however, is based on a
survey of the Act's legislative history,"' not on any express provision of
the LMRDA as required by section 559 of the APA.'"
Despite this absence of any express modification, the Court
seems to have concluded that those provisions of section 706 that re-
quire review based on the whole record and that allow challenges to
factual determinations do not apply to the Secretary's decision under
the LMRDA. The only way the Court could reach that conclusion is
by assuming that section 701(a)(2) excepted the Secretary's decision
from the operation of section 706 and the APA's other review
provisions.'" Thus, the Court's treatment of the scope of review
133
 The Court's limitations on its scope of review are treated more fully in the
text at notes 179-201 infra. Here scope of review is discussed only in enough detail to
show that the action fell under § 701(a)(2).
136
 421 U.S. at 571-73. See text at notes 172-177 infra.
132
 Id. at 573.
13" S. REP, No. 572, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945).
13° 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970).
140
 421 U.S. at 568.
14 ' Id. at 568-71. Relying on this legislative history, the Court concluded that
since Congress relied on the knowledge and discretion of the Secretary for effective
implementation, a court is "not authorized to substitute its judgment for the decision of
the Secretary not to bring suit ...." /d. at 571. In Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, the
Court similarly concluded that it was not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency, but did not find it necessary to limit the normal scope of review under §
706(2)(A).
142
 There is ample evidence in the LMRDA's language and legislative history of
an intent to grant the Secretary broad discretion, but there is no evidence of an intent
to expressly modify the provisions of the APA. Indeed, § 606 of the LMRDA seems to
reject that notion by stating that "[t]he provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
shall be applicable to ... any adjudication authorized or required pursuant to the pro-
visions of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 526 (1970).
113
 It is difficult to imagine a more highly discretionary agency action than the
Secretary's decision to file suit under § 402 of the LMRDA. The lower federal courts,
when faced with the precise issue presented in Bachowski, often found the decision
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issue indicates that to some extent the Secretary's decision did fall
under section 701(a)(2) and that, as a result, the review provisions of
the APA did not apply.
Viewed as an "extent approach" case, the Court in Bachowski
seemed to adopt the conceptualization of reviewability that divides the
administrative action into reviewable and nonreviewable elements.'"
The Court determined that, while the Secretary's ultimate decision
could be reviewed for abuse of discretion, the factual basis of the
Secretary's conclusions could not be challenged.'" Thus, in Bachowski,
the Court seems to have adopted the method suggested in Overton
Park for reconciling the language of section 701(a)(2) with the pre-
sumption of review. 14 "
The Court was justifiably concerned with reconciling the con-
gressional intent to grant the Secretary broad discretion with the
APA's expansive review provisions. It may be questioned, however,
whether these considerations are better reconciled through the extent
approach or through the invocation of common law review. As an ex-
tent case, Bachowski may result in the piecemeal denial of full APA re-
view for an increasing number of discretionary administrative actions.
Administrative agencies, in the wake of Bachowski, are likely to argue
that the legislative histories of their enabling statutes also evince a
"congressional purpose narrowly to limit the scope of judicial review,"
and thus require a limited Bachowski-type review. Courts, believing
that the scope of review under section 706 may be modified in the ab-
sence of an express modification, are likely to agree, resulting in the
removal of more and more administrative actions from full APA re-
view. If the Court in Bachowski had found that the Secretary's decision
fell entirely under section 701(a)(2) but was still subject to common
law review, the likelihood of restricting full APA review for less dis-
committed to the Secretary's discretion by law. E.g., Ravaschieri v. Shultz, 75 L.R.R.M..
2272, 2275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Bachowski, Justice Rehnquist explicitly found that the
Secretary's decision was "precisely the kind of 'agency action committed to agency
discretion by law' exempted from the judicial review provisions of the APA." 421 U.S.
at 595. The Secretary's broad discretion has also been recognized by courts when inter-
preting other aspects of § 402(b) of the LMRDA. For example, § 402(b) states that if
the Secretary finds probable cause to believe a violation of the LMRDA's election provi-
sions has occurred, he "shall bring a civil action ... to set aside the invalid election
...." 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970). Although § 402(b) seems to require the Secretary to
file suit whenever a violation of § 401 is discovered, the Supreme Court has determined
that the Secretary may not We suit until he determines that the violation probably al-
fected the election's outcome. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. 463,
472 (1968). In DeVito v. Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682, 2683 (D.D.C. 1969), the court sug-
gested that the Secretary's discretion is so great that he need not file suit even where he
has probable cause to believe the outcome of the election was affected if he has a ra-
tional basis for declining to sue. But see Howard v. Hodgson, 490 F.2d 1194, 1197 (8th
Cir. 1974). If such a highly discretionary administrative action can be found not com-
mitted to agency discretion by law, section 70100(2) is likely to be stripped of all vitality
in the wake of Bachowski.
144 Sec text at note 77 SUPTa,
145 421 U.S. at 573.
14° See text at note 78 supra.
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cretionary administrative actions would be reduced. Courts are likely
to be better able to withstand an onslaught of Bachowski-type claims by
agencies if acceptance of their claims results not in modifications of
the APA but rather in the total inapplicability of the APA's review
provisions.
In any event, only upon a showing of discretion as high as that
present in Bachowski should any of the provisions of the APA be ex-
cluded. If courts can resist the urge toward excessive modification of
the APA and if the findings of implied modifications can be made
compatible with section 559 of the APA, 147 the extent approach, ap-
parently adopted by the Court in Bachowski, is an acceptable way of
preserving administrative discretion while at the same time providing
judicial review.
II. THE SCOPE OF REVIEW DETERMINATION
After holding an agency action reviewable, a court must still de-
termine the proper scope of review—the intensity of the judicial in-
quiry into the reviewable action. 14" The usual scope of review in fed-
eral courts is that specified in section 706 of the APA. 14 " Section
706(2) identifies six standards which courts should apply when exer-
cising normal section 706 review.'" In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 15 ' the Supreme Court held that when reviewing an adminis-
trative action under section 706, a court may always set aside actions
that are an abuse of discretion, in violation of constitutional rights, in
excess .of statutory jurisdiction, or in violation of procedural
requirements.' 52 The substantial evidence and de novo review stand-
ards, however, were held applicable only where reviewing an ad-
judicatory hearing that produces a factual record.' 53
When dealing with highly discretionary administrative actions a
court may determine that the normal scope of review will frustrate
the agency's purpose. In such situations, courts have adopted limited
scopes of review sua sponte in order to provide review without
eliminating the value of discretion.'" The concept of a limited scope
of review, while occasionally recognized, is seldom analyzed.'" It will
be analyzed here by developing an interpretation of section 706 of the
APA which focuses on the meaning of a limited scope of review and
by suggesting the effect of Bachowski on that interpretation.
147 See text at notes 139-142 supra.
1 ' 8 Davis. TEXT, supra note 23, § 28.01 at 509.
149 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413 (1971).
' 88 For the text of § 706 see note 22 supra.
191 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
' 82 1d. at 413-14.
1 " Id. at 414-15. Accord, Camp v. Pins, 411 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1973) (per curium);
Board of Education v. HEW, 396 F. Supp. 203, 211 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
"4 See cases cited notes 157-164 infra.
"5 See Saferstein, supra note 42, at 390-96; DAVIS. TEXT. supra note 23, § 29.07.
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A limited scope of review differs from the normal section 706
scope of review by the exclusion of one or more of the standards of
review specified in section 706(2). The authority for this process of
exclusion can be found in the part of section 701(a) that reads "[t]his
chapter applies ... except to the extent that ... agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law."'" Thus, if judicial review
is conceptualized as consisting of a number of separable issues
—including review for abuse of discretion, statutory violations,
and constitutional violations—a court may review an element of an
administrative action for violations of statutory or constitutional provi-
sions but refuse to review for an abuse of discretion because, to "that
extent," the element is committed to agency discretion. When employ-
ing a limited scope of review, the lower federal courts usually adopt
the constitutional, jurisdictional, and procedural standards of section
706.' 57
 For example, in Ness Investment Corp. v. Department of
Agriculture, 156
 the court held that the Secretary of Agriculture's denial
of a special use permit, an action in part committed to agency discre-
tion by law, was reviewable for violations of statutory, regulatory, and
constitutional provisions.
There appears to be no case in which the substantial evidence or
de novo review standards have been included in a limited scope of re-
view. This is to be expected because these two standards represent
the most "unlimited" review available under section 706. In addition,
factual records are seldom produced by an agency when taking an ac-
tion committed to its discretion. 15 "
There has been a great dispute over the applicability of the
abuse of discretion standard to a limited scope of review.'" In
Strickland v. Morton,'" for example, the court held that a discretionary
administrative action was reviewable to determine whether the agency
had exceeded statutory authority, but not reviewable where the claim
156
 For the text of § 701(a) see note 11 supra.
157
 Strickland v. Morton, 5l9 F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir. 1975) (discretionary action
ca be reviewed where issue is whether agency violated statute, regulation, or Constitu-
tion); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Schaffer, 424 F.2d 847, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dis-
cretionary action can he reviewed where the issue is whether the agency acted illegally);
Pence v. Morton, 391 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (D. Alaska 1975) (discretionary action can be
reviewed where the issue is constitutional violation); el: Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc.,
517 F.2d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1975) (final administrative action can be reviewed where
issue is whether there was an "absence of fundamental due process").
'" 512 F.2d 706, 715 (9th Cir. 1975).
I58
 In Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415, the Court stated that the Secretary of
Transportation's action was "not designed to produce a record that is to be the basis of
agency action—the basic requirement for substantial-evidence review." Accord, Rothman
v. Hospital Serv., 510 F.2d 956, 959-69 (9th Cir. 1975), where the court refused to sub-
ject a discretionary action of the Secretary of HEW to the substantial evidence test be-
cause of the lack of a factual record.
165
 Berger feels that a court may always review for an abuse of discretion while
Davis believes that in some instances a court may not. Compare Berger, Synthesis, supra
note 45, with DAVIS. TExr.supra note 23, § 28.05.
1 °' 519 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1975).
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was merely that the agency had abused its discretion by deciding ad-
versely to the complainant.' 62 A contrary conclusion was reached in
LilleII v. Morton,'" where the court expressly held that a court exercis-
ing limited review may "determine if there was an abuse of ...
discretion.' 64
Once the abuse of discretion standard is adopted, a court em-
ploying a limited scope of review must define that standard. Through
definition, however, courts have been known to deny review for an
abuse of discretion while claiming to provide it. For example, in Ness
Investment, 165 the court stated that it would review for an "abuse of
discretion" where the complaint alleged violations of constitutional,
statutory, regulatory, or other legal mandates or restrictions.'" Under
such a definition, a plaintiff who alleges an abuse of discretion under
section 706(2)(A) receives a degree of review no different than that
available under section 706(2)(B), (C), and (D). 167
In Overton Park, the Supreme Court defined an abuse of discre-
tion as a decision that is not based on a consideration of all the rele-
vant factors or that reveals a clear error in judgment.'" Where a
relevant factor has not been considered, the case is remanded to the
agency with instructions to consider it.'" When all the relevant factors
have been considered, a clear error of judgment occurs where there is
no rational basis for the decision."° Prior to Bachowski, no court em-
ploying a limited scope of review used the Overton Park definition of
an abuse of discretion."'
In addition to selectively excluding standards of review, a court
may also limit its scope of review by restricting the evidentiary base on
which it decides the merits of challenges to administrative actions. Sec-
tion 706 of the APA requires a reviewing court to make its decision
based on the "whole record."'" The Senate Judiciary Committee re-
port states that when reviewing the "whole record" a court must "not
look only to the case presented by one party [but must consider all
relevant factors] since other evidence may weaken or even indisputa-
' 62 Id. at 471. Accord, Ness inv. Corp. v. Department of Agriculature, 512 F.2d
706, 715 (9th Cir. 1975); cf. Pence v. Morton, 391 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (D. Alaska
1975).
' 63 445 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1971).
' 64 Id. at 1211. Accord, Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 395 F.2d 353,
359 (6th Cir. 1968); Northeast Community Organization, Inc. v. Weinberger, 378 F.
Supp. 1287, 1297 (D. Md. 1974); Suwannee Steamship Co. v. United States, 354 F.
Supp. 1361, 1364 (Gust. Ct. 1973).
165 512 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1975).
' 66 1d. at 715.
167 For the text of § 706 see note 22 supra.
' 6" 401 U.S. at 416.
' 69 1d. at 420. See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973) (per curiam).
1 " See, e.g., Bowman Trans., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S.
281, 285-86 (1974).
"' See text at notes 187-89 infra.
"2 For the text of § 706 see note 22 supra.
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bly destroy that ease."'" In Overton, Park and Camp v. Piaci" the
Court applied the whole record requirement to review nonadjudica-
tory agency action.' 75 Realizing that the whole record of an informal
administrative action may not be embodied in written documents,
however, the Court did authoriie reviewing courts to take the tes-
timony of agency officials where the record is unclear.'" In Bachowski,
the Court appears to have rejected this whole record requirement in
its limited scope of review.' 77
Any court which held that an action falling under section
701(a)(2) is reviewable at common law would he faced with the task of
constructing a common law limited scope of review. It is unlikely that
a common law limited scope of review would differ substantially from
that developed under the APA. When deciding which issues are re-
viewable, a court receives little guidance from the APA. Indeed, Pro-
fessor Davis has suggested that limited scopes of review, even under
the APA, are a judicial creation.'" Consequently, when providing
common law review, courts are likely to turn to similar judicial tech-
niques in order to preserve discretion while providing review.
Bachowski appears to be the first case in which the Supreme
Court has created a limited scope of review. That the Court was in
fact limiting its scope of review is revealed by the majority's reliance
on a "congressional purpose narrowly to limit the scope of judicial re-
view 1 " Chief Justice Burger cited this limitation by stating that
"the Court has fashioned an exceedingly narrow scope of review of
the Secretary's determination not to bring an action ...."'"
In terms of the selective application of section 706(2) standards
as a means of limiting the scope of review, the Court indicated that
the Secretary's decision was subject to judicial review under the con-
stitutional, jurisdictional, procedural, and abuse of discretion stand-
ards specified in section 706."' Reviewing discretionary administrative
actions for constitutional, jurisdictional, and procedural violations is
173 S. Doc. No, 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1946). See also Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487.88 (1951); DAVIS. TEXT, supra note 23, 29.03.
1 " 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curiam).
'" In Overton Park, the Court stated that review on the "whole record" requires
review "to be based on the ,full administrative record that was before the Secretary at
the time he made his decision." 401 U.S. at 419.
'" Id. at 420.
1 " See text at notes 190-94 infra.
"8 By the very terms of the APA, the scope of review may be less than
what is specified in section 706 for section 701 provides—"this chapter
applies ... except to the extent that agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." The scope of review may accordingly ... be scaled
down .... And some of the law that scales down scope of review is
judge-made law.
DAVIS, Tfxr,supra note 23, § 29.07 at 535.
1 " 421 U.S. at 568.
100 /d. at 590.
181 1d. at 566, 574.
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not unusual.'" The ease with which the Court adopted the abuse of
discretion standard, however, is surprising in light of the debate over
whether discretionary administrative actions should be reviewed for
abuses of discretion.' 83
 The Court's approach suggests that those is-
sues usually considered by a court when deciding whether to review
for an abuse of discretion are more appropriately considered when
determining the proper evidentiary basis of review. For example,
when deciding if the Secretary's decision not to sue under section
402(b) of the LMRDA should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
the lower federal courts -
 have faced such issues as whether review for
an abuse of discretion would inhibit the Secretary's use of discretion
to the detriment of the congressional purpose of promoting intra-
union democracy while preserving union autonomy,'" and whether
the threat of such review will cause the Secretary to perform his
screening task more fairly and thoroughly.'" In contrast, the Su-
preme Court in Bachowski never considered these factors in deciding
whether to review for an abuse of discretion. Instead, the Court made
these considerations the basis for requiring such review to be based
upon the statement of reasons.'"
The Court's definition of an abuse of discretion emerges from
its comments concerning how the district court should evaluate the
Secretary's statement of reasons. The district court was directed to de-
termine whether the Secretary's decision has a rational and defensible
basis or whether it was reached for an "impermissible reason or for
no reason at all."'" In addition, the district court was empowered to
request the Secretary to supplement his statement if it inadequately
reveals his reasons.' 88
 This approach is an adoption of Overton Park's
definition of an abuse of discretion: discretion is abused if an action is
not based on all the relevant factors or is clearly an error of
judgment. 18 "
Perhaps the most significant contribution of Bachowski to the
concept of a limited scope of review is its attempt to restrict the basis
of review to a statement of reasons for the administrative decision.
The idea of requiring the Secretary to provide a statement of reasons
originated in the district court's decision in DeVito v. Shultz."° Prior to
1 " 2 See text at notes 57-58 supra.
'" See text at notes 161.64 supra.
' 84 See, e.g., Ravaschieri v. Shultz, 75 L.R.R.M. 2272, 2275 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); De-
Vito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.D.C. 1969).
18' See Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81
YALE L.J. 407, 500 (1972) where the authors suggest that the Secretary may occasionally
refuse to sue under § 402 in order to preserve congenial relations with union officers
with whom he must deal in management disputes.
188 See 421 U.S. at 568-71.
'" Id. at 573. Similar criteria are suggested in DeVito v. Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M.
2682, 2683 (D.D.C. 1969).
'HH 421 U.S. at 574-75.
189 See text at notes 168-71 supra.
190 300 F. Supp. 380, 384 (D.D.C. 1969).
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Bachowski, however, there was disagreement as to what function such a
statement was to play. The court of appeals in Bachowski, for example,
ordered the Secretary to provide a statement of reasons but consid-
ered it more as a discovery device to aid the plaintiff in preparing for
a hearing challenging the factual : bases for the Secretary's
conclusions."' The Supreme Court, on• the other hand, declared that
in most cases the statement of reasons would be the sole basis upon
which the Secretary's decision not to sue under section 402(b) of the
LMRDA would be reviewed.'" Not only would there be no factual
hearing, but the reviewing court would not be permitted to base its
decision on the whole administrative record. Moreover, the statement
of reasons would not be required to contain detailed findings of fact,
although it must reveal "the grounds of decision and the essential
facts upon which the Secretary's inferences are based."'" Thus, a
court would be precluded from deciding a plaintiff's challenge to the
factual bases for the Secretary's conclusions.'"
The Secretary, pursuant to the order of the court of appeals,
had prepared a statement of reasons in the Bachowski case.'" While
the Court expressed no opinion as to the sufficiency of this statement,
it may be analyzed to determine the practical operation of the state-
ment of reasons requirement. On its face, the statement suggests that
the Secretary's conclusion lacked a rational basis. The Secretary's
reason for refusing to file suit , was that the discovered violations did
not affect the outcome of the election.'"" The Secretary's investiga-
tion, however, which covered 80 of District 20's 190 locals, revealed
that violations of section 901 of the LMRDA may have invalidated 884
votes."' Considering that Bachowski lost the election by only 907
votes, the Secretary, in effect, claimed that investigation of the other
110 locals would not reveal 23 invalid votes. The laws of probability
belie the rationality of the Secretary's conclusion. The Secretary may,
however, have had other reasons for refusing to initiate the suit. For
example, the Secretary may have believed that the violations would be
unprovable in court. Consequently, the district court will probably
provide the Secretary with an opportunity to supplement his state-
ment with additional reasons.
It should be noted that the statement of reasons approach is
confined to allegations of an abuse of discretion. Where a complaint
alleges that an action of the Secretary is beyond the bounds of the
Act, defiant of the Act, or unconstitutional, the Court apparently
would allow review "beyond the confines of the reasons statement
Igi BaGhOWSki, 502 F.2d at 90.
' 92 421 U.S. at 572-73.
'° Id. at 573-79.
IH Id. at 573.
1 " The statement is printed as an appendix to the Supreme Court's opinion. Id.
at 578-90.
1 " Id. at 589.
' 97 Id. at 588.
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...." 1 " The nature of this extended review, however, is not entirely
clear. There is a suggestion that this review would consist of a "trial
type hearing."'" With the exception of those few cases entitled to de
novo review under section 706(2)(F), 200 however, judicial review
under the APA is more an appellate-type review. The Court probably
does not mean to expand the category of cases entitled to de novo re-
view under section 706(2)(F). A more reasonable assumption is that
this extended review would encompass the whole administrative rec-
ord
In summary, the differentiation between the abuse of discretion
standard and the constitutional and statutory standards highlights
Bachowski's unique approach to the creation of a limited scope of re-
view. The Court, while concerned with preserving the value of ad-
ministrative discretion, never considered 'prohibiting review for abuses
of discretion. Rather, discretion is preserved by limiting the eviden-
tiary basis of the inquiry. Review for constitutional or statutory viola-
tions, though more "grave,"201 is less intrusive. The inquiry will not be
directed at the factual basis for the findings of no probable violation
or no probable effect. Therefore, in such situations, a court's deter-
mination may be based on the whole administrative record.
Bachowski's statement of reasons approach is likely to be a useful
tool for balancing the competing demands for administrative discre-
tion and judicial review. However, the Court's basis for limiting its
scope of review is unclear because of its inadequate treatment of sec-
tion 701(a)(2). If the Secretary's decision was not committed to discre-
tion by law then the decision was not excepted by section 701(a)(2)
from the standards of section 706. Thus, the Court seems to have
been without authority to alter the scope of review under section 706
in the absence of an express modification of the APA in the LMRDA.
If, on the other hand, some aspects of the Secretary's decision did fall
under section 701(a)(2) then these aspects were not governed by the
review provisions of the APA, and the Court's claim that it was indeed
reviewing under the APA is misleading.
CONCLUSION
The Bachowski decision establishes certain guidelines which are
important to plaintiffs seeking judicial review of administrative ac-
tions. The plaintiff should first argue that neither of section .701(a)'s
subdivisions apply to the action in question. If successful, the plaintiff
"8 Id. at 574.
In Id. at 573-74. One of Bachowski's claims that will be dealt with on remand is
that the Secretary's action was dearly beyond the bounds of the Act and that Bachowski
is therefore entitled to a trial-type hearing. Plaintiffs verified motion for further pro-
ceedings and relief on remand, Bachowski v. Brennan, Civil No. 73-0954 (W.D. Pa.
1973).
'°° See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 414-15.
'°' 421 U.S. at 574.
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would be entitled to "unlimited" section 706 review. If the court
should find in the underlying statute a congressional intent to pre-
clude review under section 701(a)(1), a result which is becoming in-
creasingly rare, the plaintiff would be reduced to arguing the uncon-
stitutionality of such an enactment. If section 701(a)(2) of the APA
applies, the plaintiff should argue that the result is not automatic
nonreviewability. The plaintiff should point out that under the cur-
rent interpretation of section 701(a)(2), the court may separate the
discretionary action into reviewable and nonreviewable elements. Al-
ternatively, the plaintiff could argue that section 701(a)(2)'s immediate
effect is only to remove the action from the APA and that once out-
side the APA, the action is still reviewable under common law. While
Bachowski might hinder such a claim, its treatment of the scope of re-
view issue tends to support the existence of common law review. If
the court adopts either the extent or common law approach to section
701(a)(2), the plaintiff should urge the court to adopt a scope of re-
view that includes the abuse of discretion standard. Bachowski supports
such a claim because it allows the court to review even highly dis-
cretionary actions for an abuse of discretion, provided the evidentiary
base is limited to something less than the whole administrative record.
DENNIS LAF1URA
Copyright — Validity of Copyright Renewal — Evidentiary Effect of
Renewal Certificate — Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows,
Inc. 1 — David W. Griffith produced and directed the motion picture
classic The Birth of a Nation in 1914. 2 The David W. Griffith Corpora-
tion [hereinafter DWG), a corporation personally controlled by Grif-
fith, copyrighted The Birth as an unpublished work in 1915, and in the
same year acquired a copyright in the published work by exhibiting
the film with notice of copyright. 3 Two months later DWG assigned
both copyrights to Epoch Producing Corporation [hereinafter Epoch]
and Thomas Dixon, author of the novel on which The Birth was
' 522 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 740.
Id. Statutory copyright in an unpublished work is acquired by depositing a copy
and registering the work with the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1970). Statutory
copyright in the published work is acquired by publication of the work with notice of
copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970); Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S.
30, 35.42 (1939). Although copyright in the published work is thus acquired without
registration with the Copyright Office, the proprietor is not entitled to bring an in-
fringement action unless the copyright in the work has been so registered. 17 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1970). See 522 F.2d at 740-41 n.2. When copyright in the published work has
been registered, the Copyright Office issues a certificate of registration. 17 U.S.C. §
(1970). The contents of the certificate of registration are designated in 17 U.S.C. § 209
(1970).
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